A bargaining mechanism for one-way games

Published in IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Abstract: ‘We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supplychains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. Finally, we propose a privacypreserving mechanism that is incentive-compatible and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments.’

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